
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Castro Inspects Ruins After Bay Of Pigs Invasion Of Cuba

Cuba Incident--CIA At Bay

New York Times News Service

WASHINGTON — As copious evidence of a Soviet military buildup in Cuba, including the installation of anti-aircraft missiles, poured into Washington in the summer of 1962, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, John A. McCone, had a strong hunch about its meaning.

He believed such an arsenal half-way around the world from Moscow had to be designed ultimately to protect even more important installations — longrange offensive missiles and nuclear weapons yet to be provided.

McCone told President Kennedy about his hunch but specified that it was a personal guess entirely lacking in concrete supporting evidence. He

scrupulously refused to impose his hunch on the contradictory documentary and photoanalysis evidence being provided by the intelligence community over which he presided. He continued to pass to the President and his advisers reports and estimates—based on all available evidence—that the Soviet Union was not likely to do what he believed in his heart it was doing.

When the evidence that the Russians had implanted offensive missiles in Cuba did come in, McCone was among those around the President who argued for quick, decisive air action before the missiles could become operative. But when the President decided on his block-tade-and-ultimatum policy, McCone loyally supported it and helped carry it out.

1963, McCone was personla favor of the proposed

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